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Can Doing Good Reduce Risk?
Corporate Responsibility and Risk for Firms
In Controversial Industries
Emily Iehl
ABSTRACT. A firm’s main goal is to add firm value. There are many ways to do this:
increase sales, advertise, change management, and, possibly, doing good for the
environment, employees, and others. The latter approach is often called corporate social
responsibility. This paper tests to see if corporate social responsibility will reduce risk
for a firm. There are two hypotheses created by Jo and Na (2012): the risk reduction
hypothesis and the window-dressing hypothesis. Jo and Na conclude that corporate social
responsibility in controversial firms can help reduce firm risk. However, my results do
not show that.

I. Introduction
The definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has evolved
throughout time (Laskowska 2018). CSR is when a firm uses corporate
resources to support social initiatives (Godfrey et al. 2008). Can a
business do well while doing good? Should a firm focus on more than
just adding firm value? Does CSR add firm value? These questions get
muddier when thinking about firms in controversial industries. This
paper will evaluate controversial firms and the effectiveness of CSR.
Specifically, does CSR lower firm risk in controversial industries? Jo
and Na use data from 1991 until 2001 and find a statistically significant
negative relationship between firm risk and CSR (2012). Using updated
data from years 1999 to 2016, I find that the results from Jo and Na do
not hold true.

II. Background
Firm value is the number of shares times stock price. When I first heard
about CSR, it struck me as odd that most firms don’t do good simply to
do good, but rather because firms believe it is necessary to increase firm
value. My curiosity led me to listen to a podcast called “Does Doing
Good Give You License to be Bad?” from Freakonomics (Dubner 2018).
The podcast discusses the effectiveness of CSR and employee work
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ethic/productivity. The podcast argued through real life experiments that
employees working at firms that engage in CSR are more likely to act
unethically than employees working at firms that do not engage in CSR
activities.
The earliest debate about a firm’s social responsibility was between
Adolph Berle (1931) and Merrick Dodd (1932). Berle argued that a firm
should act in a way that is most beneficial to the firm regardless of social
and economic implications. Dodd argues that firms do have a social
responsibility, do need to be economically fair, and ought to be socially
responsible. Scholars have since then fallen on each side of the debate.
Recently scholars seem to agree that CSR activities most often generate
higher corporate financial performance (CFP) (Godfrey et al. 2008) and
overall is beneficial for both the firm and society.

III. Literature Review
Because of growing concern from customers and employees on the
social effects of firms, there has been an increase in work examining
CSR. Stakeholder theory is closely tied to CSR. Stakeholder theory
suggests that managers must meet standards that are no longer limited to
shareholders but include many other individuals and groups. These
include employees of the firm, customers and suppliers, society, and all
those who might suffer from negative externalities of the firm. The
stakeholder theory is why many scholars and firms feel CSR is not
optional but mandatory for adding value to the firm. Spiller asks if it is
possible for a business to achieve a triple bottom line (2000). The triple
bottom line is a bottom line for environmental, social, and financial
performance. Firms engaging in CSR are trying to achieve a positive
triple bottom line. Spiller and many others agree that most firms can
achieve it (2000).
When it comes to controversial firms, are their CSR efforts done in
vain? Controversial firms will be defined later more specifically in the
Data section. For now, think of controversial firms as firms involved
with one or more of these industries: tobacco, gambling, alcohol, nuclear
power, firearms, and/or military activity. Time and place do matter for
defining the term controversial. Much of this paper could be used to
debate whether these industries should be considered controversial, but
instead let’s skip the politics and just consider them to be controversial
here in the United States.
Many scholars believe that CSR can help society and firms. CSR is
seen as a way to reduce firm risk, defined as the standard deviation of a
firm’s daily stock returns, and to improve corporate financial
performance (CFP) through building strong relationships among
employees, stakeholders, and management, hedging risk in times of
economic instability, providing insurance-like protection, increased
profitability and respect (Laskowska 2018), and through praise and
attention in the eyes of the media (Zyglidopoulos et al. 2012).
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First, Spiller argues that through CSR a firm can expect “increasing
productivity and loyalty of employees; improving customer sales and
loyalty; growing supplier commitment; improving environmental
quality; and reducing legislative demands with strengthening community
and government relations (2000, 150).” He argues that investing
ethically, having an ethical business, and spending on CSR need not hurt
your firm, but will reduce risk and increase CFP (2000).
Second, Braune, Charosky, and Hikkerova go further and explain
that firms with high CSR can increase stock performance relative to
firms with less CSR, especially in times of uncertainty and economic
instability (2019). Their paper looks at the years 2005-2014 and
examines the changing financial markets. It includes times prior to the
financial crisis, the peak of the financial crisis, and the rebound from the
crisis. They evaluate a firm's social performance and financial
performance while taking into consideration the volatility of the S&P100
securities. They conclude that the negative relationship between CSR
and systematic risk does hold. In times of crisis and uncertainty, there is
an increase in demand for firms with higher CSR.
Third, Godfrey et al. argues that certain CSR activities can reduce
risk by providing insurance-like benefit (2008). In this case, CSR is used
as a mechanism to preserve CFP rather than generate CFP. CSR is used
to signal to customers and stakeholders that the firm is acting in a way
that considers others rather than just the firm’s needs in hope of earning
respect. This in return will help preserve their financial performance.
“This study’s findings indicate that CSR, particularly investment aimed
at secondary stakeholders, represents a potential method of creating
value for shareholders in the face of certain types of negative events
(Godfrey et al. 2008 p.442).” Insurance is a way to lower risk in times of
hardships. Godfrey’s work gives great insight for how CSR may
decrease risk for firms.
Fourth, Laskowska (2018) argues that CSR firms perform as well, if
not better than firms that are not CSR firms. There are unquantifiable
benefits to implementing CSR, such as growing respect, loyalty, and
positive impacts on society. With that in mind, it is hard to run an
empirical analysis knowing that CSR has benefits that go further than
numbers may show.
Last, it is not a secret that media and news lines can dramatically
shift the perception of a firm in the eyes of consumers and society.
There are two different ways a firm can engage in CSR. It can either
increase its positive effects (for example donate to charity) or decrease
its negative activities (decrease pollution emissions). Increased media
attention will in turn increase CSR activities. This may be evidence for
the stakeholder theory. Firms are acting as if they believe that
stakeholders care about more than just financial bottom lines
(Zyglidopoulos et al. 2012).
Jo and Na develop and test two hypotheses (2012). The sources
above compliment Hypothesis 1, the risk-reduction hypothesis. Under
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the risk-reduction hypothesis, there is a negative association between
CSR engagement of firms in controversial industries and firm risk. In
short, an increased CSR score for a controversial firm will decrease firm
risk. Jo and Na conclude that the risk-reduction hypothesis holds true.
The opposing view to hypothesis 1 is that consumers and society see
through the CSR activities done by firms in controversial industries.
They perceive CSR efforts as window dressing. The CSR efforts will
increase or not affect firm risk. Few scholars argue for this opposing
view.
Campbell explains that most papers have CSR as the independent
variable and CFP or firm risk as the dependent variable (2007).
However, he argues that we may need to pay more attention to which is
the causal variable. Perhaps firms with higher CFP are engaging in more
CSR activities because of the extra profits. He makes a strong argument
that the relationship of CSR to CFP too often may be misplaced in
regression models. Campbell’s conclusion summarized his argument
well: “To summarize briefly, I have argued that economic conditions specifically, the relative health of corporations and the economy and the
level of competition to which corporations are exposed affect the
probability that corporations will act in socially responsible way
(Campbell 2017 p. 962).”
Palazzo and Richter speak directly about the tobacco industry and
how any effort towards CSR is done in vain because the very nature of
the tobacco industry does not help advance any social agenda (2005).
Hypothesis two is in alignment with their argument.
Hypothesis 2 is the window dressing hypothesis. With this
hypothesis, we predict a positive or a statistically insignificant
association between CSR activities and firm risk in controversial
industries. The idea is that consumers can see through the facade of doing
good yet producing products that are harmful to society.

IV. Data
The data come from multiple sources. I used MSCI ESG KLD STATS:
1991-2016 data set for CSR measurements. Due to lack of data in years
1991-1998, I ran the regression with firms from 1999-2016. For financial
calculations and stock returns, Professor Ryan Flugum gathered data
from COMPUSTAT and CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices)
database. MSCI ESG KLD STATS puts out annual data sets of both
positive and negative environmental, social, and governance
performance indicators for publicly traded firms (MSCI 2015). MSCI
ESG assigns a binary (0,1) indicator for both strengths and concerns
depending on if the firm meets the criteria. Table 5 below explains
strengths and concerns recognized by the database.
The sample of firms used for my model consist only of controversial
firms. MSCI ESG KLD indicates whether a firm is considered
controversial or not. Controversial firms are defined in the KLD dataset
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as firms involved in producing, distributing, licensing, owners of,
retailers of one or more of the following: alcohol, firearms, gambling,
military weapons or systems, nuclear power, and/or tobacco.

V. Model
I use Jo and Na’s model with a few simplifications. As stated earlier, the
regression model will try to evaluate the relationship between CSR and
firm risk for controversial firms. Firm risk will be the dependent variable.
This will be measured by the standard deviation of a stock’s daily
returns. Several control variables will be included in the model to help
explain firm risk (CSR score, market to book ratio of assets, firm size,
firm debt, research and development, return on asset, and operating cash
flow). These all play a role in explaining firm risk and to ignore them
would compromise the validity of the regression model.
To find the CSR score, I will follow a CSR scoring metric as used
by Hillman and Keim (2001) and Baron et al. (2009). Letting the variable
𝐶 𝑖𝑗𝑡 denote the CSR activities for firm i with strength j in year t, 𝐶 𝑖𝑘𝑡
denote the CSR activities for firm i with concern k in year t, and 𝐶𝑗𝑡 and
𝐶 𝑘𝑡 the maximum number of strengths and concerns in year t for any
given firm. 𝐶 𝑖𝑡 will be the CSR score for firm i in year t with from the
formula below.

𝐶 𝑖𝑡 =

(𝛴𝑗 𝐶 𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝛴𝑘 𝐶 𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝐶 𝑘𝑡 )
(𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶𝑘𝑡 )

Firm Risk was estimated using the following model:
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑡
+ 𝛽2 × 𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 × 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽4
× 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 × 𝑅𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽6
× 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 × 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛴𝑖 𝛽𝑖
× 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s daily
stock returns in the current years. I calculated this in excel. This paper is
most interested in the independent variable of the CSR index. I suspect
that CSR will help decrease the volatility of a firm, hypothesis 1 riskreduction; this is in line with the majority of scholars. The expected
coefficient sign would then be negative. Market to book ratio is the total
value of assets divided by the book amount of assets. A firm with a
higher market to book ratio is thought to be riskier than a firm with a low
market to book ratio, so the expected coefficient is positive. The amount
of assets a firm has also helps explain the volatility in a firm. A firm can
use assets to pay off liabilities and will therefore reduce risk/volatility.
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The coefficient for assets should be negative. Debt on the other hand will
drive risk up. Debt is an obligation that the firm needs to pay. Debt
should have a positive coefficient. Both research and development are
the amount of money a firm spends on staying innovative and educated
on relevant topics. I would imagine this could be either negative or
positive. A firm needs to spend money on development and research, but
it also is risky because the research and development may not always end
up with a positive return. For that reason, I suspect that research and
development would have a negative coefficient. Return on assets is the
net income divided by total assets. The expected coefficient is negative.
Capital expenditures are the amount of money spent on fixed assets.
Some fixed assets are riskier than others, so I think that this variable may
not have a lot of influence on determining volatility in a firm. All
variables are lagged by one year, except the CSR index. This is to help
see how CSR in year t changes volatility in year t. Table 1 lists
independent and dependent variables that are used in the model.
Table 1: Variable Description
Variables

Description

Expected Sign

VOLATILITY

Standard deviation of daily stock return in current year

Independent variable

CSRINDEX(t)

CSR score in current year. Sum of strength minus sum of
concerns plus max concerns over the sum of the max
strengths and concerns in year t

Risk Reduction:
Window Dressing:

MBR

Total market value of assets divided by book value of
assets

+

LNASSET

Firm size. Natural log of firm total assets

-

LNDEBT

Natural log of firm debt

+

XRD

Research and Development

+

ROA

Return on Assets

-

CAPX

Capital Expenditures

+

BETA

CAPM Beta: Covariance of risk-free market rate and firm
risk / variance of firm risk

+

Alternative
independent variable
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There were 3,345 total observations, consisting of 497 unique firms.
The data are from years 1991 to 2016 depending on when data became
available for a given firm. Table 2 shows the summary of the sample
statistics including mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and
the break down of the industries.
Table 2: Summary of Sample Statistics
# of observations
% of observation
Controversial Industries
Alcohol
604
18
Tobacco
385
12
Gambling
586
18
Military
1394
42
Firearms
93
3
Nuclear Power
704
21
% of observations does not add to 100 because some observations fall
into up to three industries.
Variable
VOLATILITY
CSR_INDEX
LNTA
MBR
LNDEBT
XRD
CAPX
ROA
ALC
TOB
FIR
GAM
MIL
NUC
YEAR
BETA

Obs
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
3,345
0.02258
0.01193 0.00382
0.09876
3,345
0.38303
0.11441 -0.13043
0.73214
3,345
8.40679
1.85253 2.44695 14.46465
3,345
0.00071
0.00343 -0.00406
0.13366
3,345
5.21849
3.4568 -6.21461 13.01127
3,345 210.5125
802.956
0
16085
3,345
815.459 2316.574
0
34271
3,345 0.035595 0.124002
-2.5079 0.544211
3,345
0.18057
0.3847
0
1
3,345 0.115097 0.319187
0
1
3,345 0.027803 0.164431
0
1
3,345 0.175187 0.380184
0
1
3,345 0.416741 0.493093
0
1
3,345 0.210463 0.407699
0
1
3,345
2009
4.67134
1999
2016
3,345
1.0445
0.46965 -0.91692
3.7135
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VI. Results and Discussion
The regression results were not what I had expected. Many of the
independent variables were not significant at a 95% level, and ones that
were often had an unexpected coefficient sign.
The results are presented in Table 3:
Table 3: Regression Coefficients and Statistical Significance
Coef.
Std. Err
P-Value
.0220366
.00185
****
CSR_INDEX
-.0031069
.0002202
****
LNTA
.1718821
.0628456
**
MBR
.0005241
.0001055
****
LNDEBT
.0000002
.0000004
XRD
.0000004
.0000001
***
CAPX
-.0012112
.0008899
ALC
-.0031364
.0009084
***
TOB
.0008331
.0017008
FIR
.0013007
.0009836
GAM
-.0008257
.0008979
MIL
-.0001729
.0009844
NUC
-.0248701
.0020635
****
ROA
.038698
.001902
****
Constant
Note: (****) indicates a P value less than or equal to .0001, (***)
indicates a P value less than or equal to .001, (**) indicates a P value less
than or equal to .01, (*) indicates a P value less than or equal to .05
The coefficient for the CSR index as calculated in the data section
was a positive .022, and this was statistically significant. The positive
coefficient would confirm hypothesis 2, the window-dressing
hypothesis. This is contrary to the results of Jo and Na. There could be
several explanations for the different results. One is that I ran my
regression with data from 1999 to 2016, whereas their regression was
from 1991 to 2001. The consumers could have shifted their perspective
on controversial firms in this time with more recent years being windowdressing and with former years being risk reduction. Also, I had over
1,000 more observations in my regression. Another difference could
come from the data sources. Jo and Na did not make it clear where they
gathered and how they calculated their data for the CSR metric. The
difference in the data source or even the validity of the data I gathered
could explain why the main results were different.
The Coefficient for the natural log of assets is a negative .0031.
This is as predicted and is also very statistically significant. The natural
log of debt is a positive .00052 as predicted. The coefficient on the return
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on assets is a negative .0249 also as predicted and statistically significant.
The only dummy variable industry that was statistically significant was
the tobacco industry. This could be there is no difference to the
consumers and shareholders what the controversial industry is just that
it is controversial.
Table 3 summarized the variables coefficients, standard errors, and
P values. The R-squared of the regression was .3 which is not a good Rsquared. R-squared is the total variation in the dependent variable
explained by the model. And only 30 percent of the variation is explained
in the model ran. Stock returns can be very difficult to predict and model
so a low R-square is not all that surprising. However, if more financial
measurements were added to the regression this may help explain the
dependent variable better.
Table 4 has the correlation matrix. This will help to see if there is a
possibility of heteroskedasticity. As you can see, there are not any
variables that are highly correlated. If there were, this might have
explained why my results were not as expected.

-0.1648

0.0183

0.4958

0.0038

0.1251

0.3916

1.0000

-0.3510

0.0036

0.1580

-0.0269

0.1062

0.0353

0.0260

1.0000

CAPX

ROA

1.0000

0.2709

-0.0115

0.3428

0.0899

-0.0768

XRD

1.0000

-0.0093

0.3654

-0.0750

-0.0576

LNDEBT

1.0000

0.0770

-0.0328

0.0200

MBR

1.0000

0.0770

-0.4360

LNTA

1.0000

0.1389

CSR_INDEX

1.0000

VOLATILITY

ROA

CAPX

XRD

LNDEBT

MBR

LNTA

CSR_INDEX

VOLATILITY
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix
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Table 5: CSR Strengths and Concerns

Environment

Social

Governance

Strength Item
Clean Tech
Waste Management
Natural Resource Use
Energy Efficiency
Other Strengths
Community
Engagement
Human Right Policies
Union Relations
Board of DirectorsGender
Nutrition and Health
Other Strengths
Financial System
Instability
Other Strength

Concern Item
Toxic Emission and
Waste
Impact of Products
Water Stress
Operational Waste
Other Concerns
Community Impact
Human Rights
Violations
Health and Safety
Concern
Child Labor
Customer Relations
Other Concerns
Bribery & Fraud
Controversial
Investments
Other Concerns

Some other areas of improvement for the paper would include
comparing these results to firms that are not in controversial industries.
This would allow us to see how CSR and firm risk are related in other
industries. Another improvement might be to run the regression with
CAPM beta as the measurement of firm risk. Beta measures firm risk
relative to the market risk. This might be interesting to examine as well.
However, I was limited on my ability to calculate CAPM beta due to lack
of computing power and time. Also, doing a similar regression but with
non-controversial firms would help compare if the CSR index were a
useful metric in determining firm risk.
VII. Conclusion
Does CSR reduce firm risk in controversial industries? Under the risk
reduction hypothesis, the answer should be yes. Under the window
dressing hypothesis, CSR would not decrease firm risk. The paper I was
replicating concluded that corporate social responsibility does
statistically significantly decrease firm risk within controversial
industries. I did not find that to me true in this paper. Though statistically
significant, corporate social responsibility seemed to increase firm risk
in controversial industries.
There could be improvements to improve the regression as stated in
the results section. Despite the room for improvements, I was able to
learn about firm risk and the ever-growing concept of corporate social
responsibility and corporate governance.

12

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2020

References
Baron, David, Maretno A. Harjoto, and Hoje Jo. 2009. “The
Economics and Politics of Corporate Social Performance.” St.
Louis: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Accessed March 1,
https://search- proquestcom.proxy.lib.uni.edu/docview/1698350826?accountid
=14691.
Berle, A. A. 1931. “Corporate Powers as Power in Trust.” Harvard
Law Review 44, no. 7 (May): 1049-1074. Accessed March 15,
2020. https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.uni.edu/stable/
1331341?sid=primo&origin=crossref&seq=1#metadata_info_t
ab_contents
Bhattacharyya, Asit and Md Lutfur Rahman. 2019. “Mandatory
CSR Expenditure and Firm Performance.” Journal of
Contemporary Accounting and Economics 15, no. 3 (October):
1-17. Accessed February 8, 2020.
https://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcae
Braune, Eric, Pablo Charosky, and Lubica Hikkerova. 2019.
“Corporate Social Responsibility, Financial Performance and
Risk in Times of Economic Instability.” Journal of
Management and Governance 23, no. 4 (June): 1007-1021.
Accessed February 9, 2020. https://doi. org /10.1007/s10997019-09476-y.
Campbell, John L. 2007. “Why Would Corporations Behave in
Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of
Corporate Social Responsibility.” The Academy of
Management Review 32, no. 3 (July): 946-967. Accessed
March 19, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20159343.
Dodd, E. Merrick. 1932. “For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?” Harvard Law Review 45, no. 7 (May): 1145-1163.
Accessed March 17, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable
/1331697.
Dubner, Stephen J. 2018. “Does Doing Good Give You License to Be
Bad?” (podcast). Accessed November 25, 2019.
https://freakonomics.com/podcast/corporate-socialresponsibility

Iehl: Can Doing Good Reduce Risk?

13

Godfrey, Paul C., Craig B. Merrill, and Jared M. Hansen. 2008.
“The Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility
and Shareholder Value: An Empirical Test of the Risk
Management Hypothesis.” Strategic Management Journal 30,
no. 4 (December): 425-445. Accessed February 15, 2020.
https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.uni.edu
/doi/abs/10.1002/ smj.750
Hillman, Amy J., and Gerald D. Keim. 2001. “Shareholder Value,
Stakeholder Management, and Social Issues: What’s the
Bottom Line?” Strategic Management Journal 22, no. 2
(February): 125-139. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://wwwjstor-org.proxy.lib. uni.edu/
stable/3094310?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Jo, Hoje and Haejung Na. 2012. “Does CSR Reduce Firm Risk?
Evidence from Controversial Industry Sectors.” Journal of
Business Ethics 110, no. 4 (September): 441-456. Accessed
February 1, 2020. https://link-springercom.proxy.lib.uni.edu/article/10.1007/s10551-012 -1492-2.
Laskowska, Anna. 2018. “Stock Market Indices as a Measurement
Tool for Profitability of Corporate Social Responsibility
Activities.” Copernican Journal of Finance and Accounting 7,
no. 4 (Fall): 71-86. Accessed March 16, 2020.
https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php /CJFA/
article/view/CJFA.2018.021.
“MSCI ESG KLD STATS: 1991-2014 Data Sets.” MSCI ESG
Research Inc. Accessed February 10, 2020.
https://www.msci.com/www/research-paper/esg-ratingsmethodology /0175943017
Palazzo, Guido and Ulf Richter. 2005. “CSR Business as Usual? The
Case of the Tobacco Industry.” Journal of Business Ethics 61,
no. 4 (November): 387-401. Accessed March 1, 2020.
https://link-springercom.proxy.lib.uni.edu/article/10.1007/s10551-005-7444-3
Sethi, S. Prakash. 1975. “Dimensions of Corporate Social
Performance: An Analytical Framework.” California
Management Review 17, no. 3 (Spring): 58-64. Accessed
March 15, 2020. https://search-proquestcom.proxy.lib.uni.edu/docview/215871556?accountid =14691
Siegel, Donald S., and Donald F. Vitaliano. 2001. “An Empirical
Analysis of the Strategic Use of Corporate Social
Responsibility.” Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 16, no. 3 (Fall): 773-792. Accessed February 9, 2020.
https://doi-org.proxy.lib.uni.edu /10.1111/j. 15309134.2007.00157.x

14

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2020

Spiller, Rodger. 2000. “Ethical Business and Investment: A Model for
Business and Society.” Journal of Business Ethics 21, no. 1
(September): 149-160. Accessed February 8, 2020. https://
link-springer com.proxy.lib.uni.edu/article/10.1023/A%3A1006445915026
Zyglidopoulos, Stelios C., Andreas P. Georgiadis, Craig E. Carroll,
and Donald S. Siegel. 2012. “Does Media Attention Drive
Corporate Social Responsibility?” Journal of Business
Research 65, no. 11 (November): 1622-1627. Accessed March
20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.10.021.

